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FROM CONTRIBUTORY TO COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE: A NEEDED LAW REFORM
FRANK E. MALONEY*

The Problem
One of the most pressing social problems facing the American
people today is the automobile accident problem. In 1957, 38,700
Americans died in automobile accidents, to say nothing of the
2,525,000 injured, many so seriously as to be permanently disabled.'
Florida, with its myriad tourist attractions and beckoning highways,
had more than its share of such accidents. In 1956, 1,205 people were
2
killed and 29,629 were injured in Florida alone.
This problem has two principal aspects, accident prevention and
adequate compensation of accident victims. As a step toward a better
accident prevention program, a comprehensive Model Traffic Ordinance for proposed municipal adoption was promulgated by the 1957
Florida legislature following two years of intensive study by the
Florida Legislative Reference Bureau.3 It is as yet too early to evaluate
this new legislation, but this is perhaps an appropriate time to examine
the other side of the coin, the compensation of automobile accident

victims. It is of course true that "the prevention of accidents is much
more satisfying than the compensation of their victims," 4 but this is
no excuse for burying our heads in the sand and refusing to evaluate
the current system for compensating such victims.
*B.A., 1938, University of Toronto; LL.B. 1942, University of Florida; member,
Continuing Law Reform Committee of The Florida Bar; Professor of Law, University of Florida, and currently Visiting Professor of Law, New York University.
lTnm TRAVELLERS INSURANCE COMPANIES, THE ROAD ToLL 27 (1958).
2These statistics were derived from Florida Highway Patrol, Monthly Summary
of Motor Vehicle Traffic Accidents in the State of Florida.
3FLA. STAT. c. 186 (1957).
4

Varnum, Comparative Negligence in Automobile Cases, 24 INS. COUNSEL J.
60, 61 (1957).
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Presently all American jurisdictions, including Florida, base liability on the fault of the party assertedly causing the injury. They
differ, however, in the legal effect that they attach to the contributory
fault of the victim. In the great majority, contributory fault or contributory negligence, on the legal level at least, is held to be a complete
bar to recovery.
A change that would lead to more equitable and more uniform
compensation would be the replacement of this contributory negligence rule with a comparative negligence approach, or more accurately a rule providing for division of damages on the basis of comparative fault. This possibility has been considered and rejected in
the past several sessions of the Florida legislature. 5 It is the purpose
of this article to examine these comparative negligence proposals and
to decide whether this type of legislation, perhaps along with new
types of insurance coverage designed to provide at least minimum protection for accident victims unable to recover under the fault system, 6
would not produce a more desirable allocation of the losses resulting
from Florida's automobile accidents.
The analysis will begin with an examination of the fault concept
itself. This will be followed by a critical examination of the contributory negligence doctrine as it has developed and is applied in most
American jurisdictions to accident litigation and settlement processes.
The contributory negligence doctrine will then be contrasted with
the comparative negligence approach that is employed throughout
most of the rest of the world, and the development of that doctrine
will be examined. Various types of comparative negligence statutes
will be investigated and their strengths and weaknesses pointed out.
The relationship between multiple party accidents and the comparative negligence doctrine will be scrutinized, together with the
advisability of apportioning damages when the plaintiff is more negligent than the defendant and the possibility of employing special verdicts in the administration of the comparative negligence rule. The
article will conclude with an over-all evaluation of the desirability of
5

See H.B. 40, Reg. Sess. (1957), which was rejected by the House committee; a
companion bill died in Senate committee. S.B. 267 Reg. Sess. (1957). Similar
legislation failed of enactment in the 1955 session. H.B. 215.
6One example of such extended coverage is found in current policy provisions
for payment of medical expenses of guests in the automobile of the insured. See
Miller, New "Uninsured Motorist" Endorsement to Family Automobile Policies-

The 1960 Look, 24 INs. COUNSEL J. 134 (1957); Risjord and Austin, The Problem
of the Financially Irresponsible Motorist, 24 U. KAN.
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CITY

L. REV. 82, 85-95 (1955).

2

Maloney: From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A NeededReform
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
a legislative switch from the contributory to the comparative negligence concept in Florida.
THE FAULT CONCEPT

Before comparing the contributory and comparative negligence
concepts, both operative within the fault system, it may be well to
consider an important underlying development in the operation of
the fault system itself. The early common law placed liability for
personal injuries on the one who caused the injury, regardless of his
innocence or culpability,7 on the theory that if one of two innocent
people must suffer, he should be the one to pay for it, rather than
the injured party.8
About the time of the industrial revolution in England, however,
this early doctrine of strict liability was superseded by the rule that
one was not liable for injuring another unless the injury resulted from
misconduct or fault, either intentional or negligent, on the part of
the one causing the injury.9 At this time insurance against accidents
was practically unknown, and the legal problem was whether the
loss resulting from the injury should fall on one party or the other.
In the laissez faire climate of the time, it was thought to be the
better practice under such circumstances not to penalize the actor
unless he was at fault; otherwise men would be unwilling to embark
on new and untried enterprises for fear of the crushing liability that
might ensue. As one of the most famous jurists of the time put it:
"[T]he public generally profits by individual activity. As action cannot be avoided, and tends to the public good, there is obviously no
policy in throwing the hazard of what is at once desirable and inevitable upon the actor."1 0 An injury inflicted without fault, in the
sense that it was not a result reasonably to be anticipated from the
conduct of the actor, was looked upon as an accident, and "loss from
accident must lie where it falls . . ,.'
But where does such loss fall? In the automobile accident cases
7Weaver v. Ward, Hobart 134, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1617).
sSee Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARv. L. Rzv. 97 (1908); Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARv. L. REv. 315, 383, 441 (1894).
9"For the convenience of mankind in carrying on the affairs of life, people as
they go along roads must expect, or put up with, such mischief as reasonable care
on the part of others cannot avoid." Holmes v. Mather, L.R. 10 Ex. 261 (1875).
OHoLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 95 (1881).

-Id. at 94,
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at least, studies indicate that it most often falls on wage earners receiving relatively small wages, often the heads of families of what has
been described as the "middle working class. "12 Serious uncompensated injury to one of the members of a family in this group may well
lead to pauperism. Even so, if the alternative is perhaps pauperizing
the one who caused the injury and, since the loss must fall on the
one or the other, distributing loss on the basis of fault appears to be
a logical and just way of handling the problem. However, it does
not necessarily follow that when both parties are partially at fault,
the entire loss must be placed on only one - the injured party, who
is the least able, from the viewpoint of his earning capacity, to bear
it.

But in the great majority of automobile accidents today it is no
longer a question simply of placing the loss solely on the shoulders
of the injured party or the one who injured him. If the burden is
initially placed on the one causing the accident, in most cases it is
promptly shifted from his shoulders to those of an insurance company.
The company in turn distributes the burden to its policyholders, so
that a large group of automobile owners shares the burden.13 Realistically, in these cases the choice then becomes one of placing the loss
on the injured party, who most frequently has no means of passing
on a part of his loss to anyone else, or distributing it among the
group benefiting from the use of the dangerous instrumentalities involved.
The Supreme Court of Florida was among the first to recognize the
desirability of making the owners of automobiles responsible for the
negligence of drivers to whom they had entrusted their vehicles. This
12COLUMBIA
COMPENSATION

UNIVERSITY

RESEARCH

FOR AUTOMOBILE

COUNCIL,

ACCIDENTS

REPORT By

219-20

(1932),

COMMITTEE TO STUDY

reprinted in

SHULMAN

610-611 (1942).
13Such distribution is of course defeated if the offending motorist is uninsured
or a hit-and-run driver. Most Canadian provinces and the states of North Dakota
and New Jersey have established unsatisfied judgment funds to provide a possibility
of minimum compensation to parties injured in such accidents. See, e.g., N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§39:6-61 to 39:6-91 (Supp. 1955); N.D. REv. CODE c. 39-17 (Cum. Supp.
1953); ONT. REv. STAT. c. 167, §§97-109 (1950). The New Jersey fund is discussed
in Bambrick, A Look at the New Jersey Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund,
1956 INS. L.J. 725; Molnar, New Jersey's Answer to FinancialIrresponsible Motorists,
1955 INS. L.J. 729, 732-33. Still further coverage is not being provided by uninsured
motorist clauses available in some policies; see Miller, New "Uninsured Motorist"
Endorsement to Family Automobile Policies -The 1960 Look, 24 INS. COUNSEL J.
134 (1957).
AND JAMES, TORTS
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the Court accomplished by extending the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine to automobiles in the 1920 case of Southern Cotton Oil
Company v. Anderson.14 Vehicle owners are normally insured, particularly in these days of financial responsibility laws-s and motor vehicle safety responsibility acts;1 6 and the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine thus serves as a vehicle for distributing the loss caused by the

fault of negligent drivers through assuring the injured party an opportunity to sue a financially responsible defendant. About half of the
American courts have brought about a similar extension of liability,
though on a more limited scale, through the family car doctrine.17

The legislatures of a number of other states, recognizing the desirability of the approach evolved by the Florida Court, have enacted

statutes making vehicle owners liable for the negligence of those to
whom they entrust their vehicles.18
1480 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920). See Note, 5 U. FLA. L. REv. 412 (1952).
15E.g., FLA. STAT. c. 324 (1957). Comment, 6 KAN. L. REV. 358 (1958), indicates
that laws providing for financial responsibility are now found in 46 states, with
compulsory insurance being required in the other two, New York and Massachusetts.
For a note on the New York law, see 32 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 147 (1957). For a general
comment on financial responsibility laws, see 4 MAMI L.Q. 502 (1950).
16So named to distinguish it from the older type financial responsibility laws,
which gave the offending motorist a free "first bite." For a recently enacted statute
of this type, see KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-722 to 8-769 (Supp. 1957), Comment, 6
KAN. L. REv. 358 (1958). The Florida Responsibility Law of 1955, FLA. STAT. C.
324 (1957), is basically a statute of this latter type.
17PRossaR, TORTs, 369-371 (2d ed. 1955).
ISCAL. VEH. CODE ANN. §402 (West 1956); D.C. CODE §40-403 (1951); IDAHo
CODE ANN. §49-1004 (1948); Mica. STAT. ANN. §9.2101 (1952); MINN. STAT. 170.54
(1957); N.Y. VEncrIx & TRAFTic LAw §59; R.I. GEN. LAws §31.31.3 (1957). While

other states are following Florida's lead in extending liability to those in the best
position to distribute it, the Supreme Court of Florida has recently shown less
awareness of the loss distribution policy underlying the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine. In the case of Weber v. Porco, 100 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1958), the Court used
the doctrine to impute the negligence of a driver to the nonnegligent owner for
the purpose of barring the owner's action against a negligent third party tortfeasor.
The Court was apparently following (without citing) the federal courts which had
already so interpreted the Florida doctrine. MacCurdy v. United States, 143 F.
Supp. 60 (N.D. Fla. 1956), aff'd, 246 F.2d 67 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 933
(1958). The Weber case was followed in Gulick v. Whitaker, 102 So.2d 847 (Fla.
1958). Other jurisdictions with more awareness of the policy considerations involved have refused to construe their statutes to thus limit loss distribution rather
than extend it. See Stuart v. Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 74 N.W.2d 212 (1956), overruling an earlier line of cases to the contrary; Christensen v. Hennepin Transp.
Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406 (1943); Mills v. Gabriel, 359 App. Div. 60, 18
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From a purely sociological viewpoint, it may be and has been
argued that the modern possibilities for loss distribution resulting
from widespread use of the insurance device call for a further extension of loss distribution through a return to the earlier legal rule placing original liability, without regard for fault, on the one who causes
an injury, 19 since liability will then automatically be spread among
those who choose to use the instruments involved.2o Thus numerous
proposals have been made for the establishment of a system of compensation by administrative boards patterned after the workmen's
compensation systems now almost universally employed in industrial
accident cases. 21 Those who propose such a change hope to accomplish
two basic reforms: the achievement of more uniform and more adequate compensation for the injured and the elimination of the law's
delays in affording such compensation as is now available.
Recent studies of the time lapse before settlement of contested
workmen's compensation cases cast considerable doubt on whether
the objective of speedy settlement of accident claims would be effectively accomplished by shifting the basic decision as to liability to adninistrative boards. 2 The inadequacy of awards in workmen's compensation cases has been another point of major criticism of that approach. 23 Fuller coverage of the merits of these proposals is beyond
the scope of this article.24 Suffice it to say that the shift to strict liaN.Y.S. 2d 78 (2d Dep't), afJ'd, 284 N.Y. 755, 31 N.E.2d 512 (1940). Contra, National
Trucking & Storage Co. v. Driscoll, 64 A.2d 304 (D.C. Mun. App. 1949); Davis
Pontiac Co. v. Sirois, 82 R.I. 32, 105 A.2d 792 (1954).
19For an interesting historical study indicating that the common law has gone
through several cycles, "alternately approaching and receding from the culpability
theory," see Isaacs, Fault and Liability, 31 HARV. L. REV. 954 (1918).
2OSee James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948).
2lFor a bibliography, see INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, ADMINISTRATIVE
BOARDS FOR AUTOMOBILE TORT CASES - WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMPARED 34

(1956). The most recent proposal may be found in Marx, A New Approach to
Personal Injury Litigation, 19 OHIO STATE L.J. 278 (1958).
22INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, op. cit. supra note 21, App. 11, pp. 30,
81.
23See Larson, The Myth of Administrative Generosity: A Lesson From British
Experience, 40 A.B.AJ. 195 (1954); Pollack, A Policy Decision for Workmen's Compensation, 1954 INS. L.J. 14 (1954).
24The fullest American treatment of the "compensation" approach will be found
in EHRENZWEIG, "FULL AID" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM

(1954).

A revised

and abbreviated version of this book appears under the same title in 43 CALIF. L.
REv. 1 (1953).
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bility has not as yet been adopted 25 in any American jurisdiction,26
and many have serious doubts as to its workability in the automobile
accident field.27 In fact, it seems safe to predict that liability for
automobile accidents will remain based on fault for many years to
come.
Even if we are not prepared to fall back on the older principle of
strict liability now universally applied to industrial accidents, we may
still question the desirability of retaining an ancient rule of law
under which any contributory fault on the part of the injured party
places the entire loss on his shoulders.
Origin of the ContributoryNegligence Rule
Where did the rule that contributory negligence is a complete bar
to recovery originate? Most scholars attribute its origin to the English
case of Butterfield v. Forester,28 decided by the Court of King's Bench
in 1809. The case involved a defendant who negligently blocked part
of a highway with a pole; thereafter the plaintiff, leaving a "public
house," mounted his horse and, "riding violently," "cast himself
upon" the pole and was injured. The Court found for the defendant
in a very brief opinion in which one of the judges, Bayley, stated that
the plaintiff appeared to have been injured "entirely from his own
fault."29 Such was the beginning of the rule. One wonders whether
the case might have been decided differently if the proportion of fault
of the plaintiff had not been so great. Indeed, only thirty years later
a case arose in which the plaintiff had negligently anchored his
sloop partly in the channel of the Thames, after which defendant's
ship ran into it in a fog.30 At the trial the Court of Common Pleas
instructed the jury, apparently on the basis of Butterfield v. Forester,
that if they found that the injury was "imputable in any degree to any
25Such a proposal passed the Wisconsin Senate in 1929, but agitation for its
adoption ceased following the passage of comparative negligence legislation in 1931.
Hayes, Rule of Comparative Negligence and its Operation in Wisconsin, 23 OHIO
STATE BAR AsS'N REP. 233, 234 (1950).
26The Province of Saskatchewan, Canada, adopted a Compensation Plan in
1946. SAsK. Rsv. ST. c. 371 (1953).

27See Flynn, Answering Justice Hofstadter- Compensation Is No Solution, 27
N.Y.S.B. BuLL. 406 (1955); Greene, Must We Discard Our Law of Negligence in
Personal Injury Cases?, 19 Omo STATE L.J. 290 (1958); Ryan and Greene, Pedestrianism: A Strange Philosophy, 42 A.B.A.J. 117 (1956).
2811 East 59, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
291d. at 61, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927.
soRaisin v. Mitchell, 9 Car. & P. 613, 173 Eng. Rep. 979 (C.P. 1839).
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want of care or any improper conduct on the part of the plaintiff,"31
they should find for the defendant. The jury brought in a verdict
for the plaintiff for half of the admitted damages and when asked why,
"answered that there were faults on both sides." 2 The court allowed
the verdict to stand, in the teeth of the Butterfield case. If the case had
been tried in admiralty, the result would have been expected, for
the English admiralty courts had been dividing damages in cases of
mutual fault since at least 1695.33 In common law courts, however,
approval of such a division of damages by a jury was restricted to
maritime cases, and the practice of apportioning damages was not
4
always approved even then.3
In other than maritime cases, the rule that contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery was strictly applied, and was
soon adopted by American courts.35 Several reasons have been given
for the early acceptance of the rule in its all-or-nothing form rather
than the admiralty approach of diminishing damages when'the
plaintiff was partly at fault. One writer suggests as a partial explanation that the courts applied the medieval concept of causation,
sometimes referred to as the last wrongdoer rule, under which the last
responsible human being was regarded as the sole proximate cause
of the injury.3 6 The fact that, in Butterfield v. Forester and other
very early contributory negligence cases, the defendant's negligence
came before that of the plaintiff in point of time lends support to
3
this theory. 7
311d. at 616, 173 Eng. Rep. at 981.
321bid.
33
See Beckman v. Chapman, Ad. Ct. Ass. Bk., Jan. 20, 1695. Noden v. Ashton,
Libels, File 128, No. 250, Ass. Bk., June 20, 1706, both discussed in MARSDEN, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COLLISIONS AT SEA 142, 143 (10th ed. McGuflie 1953).
The equal division approach was used in English admiralty courts until 1911,
when the rule promulgated by the Brussels Maritime Convention of 1909-1910
apportioning damages in proportion to the gravity of the respective faults was
adopted through passage of the Maritime Conventions Act, 1 & 2 GEo. 5, c. 57, §U.
See Huger, Proportional Damage Rule in Collisions at Sea, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 531
(1928).
3
4See MARSDEN, op. cit. supra note 33, at 155.
.- The first American case seems to be Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621

(1824).
36James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 693, 696 (1953).
37Compare Raisin v. Mitchell, 9 Car. & P. 613, 173 Eng. Rep. 979 (C.P. 1839), in
which the court allowed a division of damages when the plaintiff's negligence preceded that of the defendant.
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Whatever the logic of the rule, it fitted in with the laissez faire
philosophy of the time3s and the unspoken social policy of protecting
valuable new industries, particularly the transportation industry,3 9
from the supposedly crippling threat of large and numerous verdicts
imposed by "incurably plaintiff minded" juries.40 The strict contributory negligence rule provided a method of controlling the juries
(often by preventing cases from reaching them) in those cases in which
contributory negligence was available as a defense. It is interesting
to note in passing that the railroads, which were the early beneficiaries of the strict no-apportionment rule, are now the major group
that has lost this protection. The federal government 4' and twentyseven states,4 2 including Florida43 have enacted legislation requiring
apportionment of damages in negligence actions against railroads by
contributorily negligent employees.
ROLE OF THE JURY IN APPLICATION OF THE
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE RULE

American juries are still plaintiff-minded, although in a different
sense from the plaintiff-mindedness of the juries that sometimes returned excessive verdicts in the early railroad cases. As a matter of
fact, studies of the University of Chicago Jury Project indicate that in
the ordinary automobile accident cases there is usually very little difference in amount between a jury verdict and the judge's award in
38For an exposition of this philosophy and its effects in the United States, see
THOUGHT 1860-1915 (1945).
9In Louisiana, between 1854 and 1888, 20 out of 21 contributory negligence
decisions concerned railways and similar forms of transportation. "This called for
caution lest the valuable new service be crippled .... ," Malone, Comparative Negligence -Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 LA. L. R.v. 125, 139 (1945).
doThat the early juries were so regarded, vis-a-vis the railroads, see Malone,
The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. RPv. 151, 156-58 (1946).
4IThe Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45
U.S.C. §§51-60 (1952). The section providing for diminution of damages in case of
contributory negligence is §53.
d2The state legislation is collected and briefly summarized in INsTruTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 24-32 (1955).
43FLA. STAT. §768.06 (1957). The predecessor of this statute was enacted in 1887,
Fla. Laws 1887, c. 3744, after McWhorter, Cj., in Louisville and N.R.R. v. Yniestra,
21 Fla. 700 (1886), while denying recovery to a contributorily negligent pedestrian,
had castigated the all-or-nothing rule and suggested legislation apportioning the
damages in such cases. Id. at 737-38. For a note on the current statute, see 2 U.
FLA. L. Rlv. 124 (1949).
HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINiSM IN AMERICAN
3
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the same case. 44 In fact, the judge would have awarded more to the
plaintiff than the jury in some thirty-three per cent of the cases
studied. 4 5 The old bugaboo of the runaway jury simply was not borne
out by the facts.
The study did confirm something about the operation of juries in
cases involving contributory negligence that had long been suspected
by lawyers and judges alike. 46 Using experimental juries picked from
actual jury panels, the Chicago group repeated a negligence trial
before a number of juries. In some instances the facts were varied
to indicate contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. In
these cases, despite standard contributory negligence instructions,
the juries found for the plaintiff but reduced the damages to take into
47
account the fault of the plaintiff.

This proclivity of the jury, to disregard contributory negligence
instructions when the negligence of the plaintiff is not too great and
to apply its own comparative negligence standard instead, is confirmed
by other studies. These indicate that when negligence cases get to
the jury, the plaintiff wins at least two thirds of the time, 48 despite
the fact that the great majority of cases in which liability is clear are
settled before trial. 49 The jury has thus become a means for ameliorating the harshness of the strict contributory negligence rule, because
in many cases the jurors will disregard instructions on the law and
44KALVEN,

REPORT ON THE

JURY PROJECT, CONFERENCE ON AIMS AND METHODS OF

(Univ. of Mich. Law School 1955); A Report on the Jury
Study Project of the University of Chicago Law School, 24 INS. COUNSEL J. 368,
LEGAL RESEARCH 30, 31

379-380 (1957).
45

KALVEN, REPORT ON THE JURY PROJECT, CONFERENCE ON AsIS AND METHODS OF

(Univ. of Mich. Law School 1955).
GSee, e.g., the statement in Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 234-35, 114 A.2d 150,

LEGAL RESEARCH 31
4

154 (1955).
47

KALVEN,

See also note 51 infra.
REPORT ON THE JURY

PROJECT, CONFERENCE ON AIMS AND METHODS OF

28 (Univ. of Mich. Law School 1955). See also Kalven, The Jury,
The Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO STATE L.J. 158, 167-168
(1958).
4
sSee 14 ANN. REP. OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF N.Y., Table 6, 94-99 (1948),
indicating verdicts for plaintiffs in New York in 1947 in between 60% and 66%
of negligence cases. THE 23RD REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MASSACHUSETTS
gives a 73.5% figure for all jury cases. 32 MAss. L.Q., Table 4, 84 (1947). See also
James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667, 687
(1949).
49"[T]he cases that are litigated . . . are presumably those which the defendant
feels are exceptionally favorable or feels that the damages are higher than a jury
would award." Powell, Contributory Negligence: A Necessary Check on the AmeriLEGAL RESEARCH

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss2/1
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"do equity" as they see it. The desirability of using the jury in this
way will be commented on later.50 Suffice it to say at this point that
the proclivity is there.51 To the extent that other rules of law are
relaxed to allow more cases to reach the jury, the chances of sub
rosa apportioning of fault among all those responsible, rather than
placing the entire burden on a contributorily negligent plaintiff, are
likewise increased.
It is therefore appropriate to examine the various ways in which
cases are today reaching juries despite allegations of contributory
negligence by the defendant. 52 The first and perhaps the most important of these is through application of the doctrine of the last
clear chance.
Last Clear Chance
This rule, which had its origin in 1842 in the English case of
Davies v. Mann,53 shifts the entire burden of the loss from a contributorily negligent plaintiff to a defendant whose negligence follows
that of the plaintiff.54 As in the case of the contributory negligence
rule itself, its explanation may lie at least partially in the medieval
tendency to regard the last wrongdoer as the sole proximate cause oi
the injury. Perhaps coupled with this was the idea that the later
negligence must necessarily be the greater negligence. 55 If one needs
convincing that this is not always so, he has only to consider the
can Jury, 43 A.B.A.J. 1005, 1007 (1957).

5OSee notes 91-93 infra and accompanying text.
51As Justice Holt put it in Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 430,
281 N.W. 261, 263 (1938), "We but blind our eyes to obvious reality to the extent
that we ignore the fact that in many cases juries apply it [apportionment of
damages] in spite of us." See also ULMAN, A JUDGE TAKES THE STAND 30-34 (1933).
52Oklahoma has guaranteed this result by a constitutional provision that the
defense of contributory negligence shall in all cases be left to the jury. OKLA.
CONsT. art. 23, §6. For studies of breakaways from strict application of the contributory negligence rule in Arkansas and Colorado, see DeMuth, Derogation of the
Common Law Rule of Contributory Negligence, 7 RocxY MT.L. REv. 161 (1935);
Leflar, The Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 ARK. L. RFv. 1 (1946).
5310 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. 1842).
54The doctrine has also been used to shift the loss from one defendant who

satisfies plaintiff's claim to a co-tortfeasor who is found to have had the "last clear
chance to avoid the accident." See, e.g., Nashua Iron & Steel Co. v. Worcester, 60
N.H. 159 (1882). For a critical discussion of the use of the doctrine for this
purpose, see Jones, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, infra p. 175.
55See Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REv. 465, 472 (1953).
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case of Poindexter v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad,56 in which the
Supreme Court of Florida applied the doctrine in favor of a motorist
who drove at a very high rate of speed into a standing railway engine
on an unobstructed crossing. Despite the factual similarity to Butterfield v. Forester, the Court found for the motorist because the engineer admitted he saw the automobile approaching, and the Court
with unimpeachable logic found that he had the last clear chance
to avoid the accident by blowing his whistle.
As originally enunciated, the last clear chance doctrine was applicable to situations in which the plaintiff or his property was in
helpless peril because of his antecedent negligence and the defendant
discovered the plaintiff's situation but negligently failed to avoid
57
Some few jurisdictions have refused to exthe consequences of it.

tend the doctrine beyond discovered peril, 58 but today most American
courts apply it to situations in which the plaintiff is not in helpless
peril, but only negligently inattentive, so long as the defendant discovers his danger.5 9 In addition, the helpless peril branch of the doctrine has been extended to include situations in which the defendant
did not discover the peril but would have discovered it but for his
negligent inattention. 60 In most jurisdictions, the doctrine is inapplicable to a negligently inattentive plaintiff whose danger is not
discovered by an inattentive defendant. Logically, the doctrine should
5656 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1951).
57As is so often the case, it is not at all clear from the facts given by the court
in the originating case of Davies v. Mann that the defendant's servant was in fact
aware that the plaintiff's ass was helpless in the highway, even though later courts
assume awareness. The last clear chance doctrine is not identified as such in
Davies v. Mann, which talks in terms of defendant's negligence as the proximate
cause of the injury.
58Hamlin v. Roundy, 96 N.H. 123, 71 A.2d 419 (1950); Chadwick v. City of
New York, 301 N.Y. 176, 93 N.E.2d 625 (1950); Cleveland Ry. v. Masterson, 126
Ohio St. 42, 183 N.E. 873 (1932).
59Gardner v. Union Oil Co., 216 Cal. 197, 13 P.2d 915 (1932); Merrill v. Stringer,
58 N.M. 372, 271 P.2d 405 (1954); Browning v. Bremerton Elec. Transit Co., 28
Wash.2d 713, 183 P.2d 1005 (1947). This more liberal approach is approved by
the American Law Institute. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §480 (1934).
6oCasey v. Marshall, 64 Ariz. 232, 168 P.2d 240 (1946); Lindsay v. Thomas, 128
Fla. 293, 174 So. 418 (1937); Leinbach v. Pickwick Greyhound Lines, 138 Kan. 50,
23 P.2d 449 (1933); REsTATEMENT, TORTS §479 (1934). Some courts, including
Florida, have been extremely liberal in finding the plaintiff in helpless peril,
applying this branch of the last clear chance doctrine to cases in which that peril
arose out of the plaintiff's prior negligent inattention and existed only for the
briefest period before the accident. Independent Lumber Co. v. Leatherwood, 102
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not apply to this situation since no one had a last chance to avoid
the accident. As Dean Prosser points out, this means that "as the
defendant's negligence increases the less his liability will be - the
man who looks and discovers the danger but is slow in applying his
brakes may be liable, where the man who never looks at all or who
has no brakes to apply is not."61 The injustice of this result has led
Missouri into illogically applying the doctrine to take some of the
negligently inattentive plaintiff-negligently inattentive defendant cases
to the jury, in effect doing away with the contributory negligence
rule in these cases. 62 Just when this "humanitarian" variation of the
last clear chance doctrine is applicable, only the judges on the Missouri
court know;63 but there seems to be a tendency for the Florida Court
to follow in their footsteps in a few recent cases. 64
Of course, the more liberally the last clear chance doctrine is applied, the more cases get to the jury in spite of the harsh contributory
negligence rule. They reach the jury, however, with instructions that
if the doctrine is applicable, the plaintiff is entitled to recover full
damages despite his own fault. It may be suspected that the jury will
often disregard the court's instructions and apportion damages according to fault.65 Yet if it is just to base liability on fault, to the extent
that the instructions are followed an injustice is done a defendant
who is charged with the entire loss occasioned by the fault of both

parties.
Although the last clear chance doctrine has made substantial inroads on the contributory negligence rule, it nevertheless cannot be
applied to the majority of contributory negligence cases in which the
Colo. 460, 79 P.2d 1052 (1938); Panama City Transit Co. v. DuVernoy, 159 Fla.
890, 33 So.2d 48 (1947), 1 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 300 (1948). But see O'Neal v. Lahnala,
253 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1958), in which the court of appeals upheld a refusal by
the District Court for the Northern District of Florida to charge on the doctrine
under such circumstances.
61PROSSER, supra note 55, at 473.
62McCall v. Thompson, 348 Mo. 795, 155 S.W.2d 161 (1941); Barrie v. St. Louis
Transit Co., 102 Mo. App. 87, 76 S.W. 706 (1903).
OsSee Becker, The HumanitarianDoctrine, 3 Mo. L. REv. 392 (1938); Gaines,
The HumanitarianDoctrine in Missouri, 20 ST. Louis L. REv. 113 (1935).
64Springer v. Morris, 74 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1954), 8 U. FLA. L. REv. 336 (1955); see

1 U. FLA. L. REv. 300 (1948).
65Lewis F. Powell, Jr., of the Virginia Bar, an advocate of retaining the present
system, suggests that instructions on the last clear chance often "confound" the
jury. Powell, Contributory Negligence: A Necessary Check on the American Jury,
43 A.B.J. 1005, 1006 (1957).
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negligence of both parties concurs in producing the injury,'3" or in
which the plaintiff's negligence comes later in point of time than that
of the defendant.
Relaxation of Negligence Per Se
What other legal techniques are available to get such cases to the
jury? One device is the relaxation of the older negligence per se approach of applying fixed standards in the determination of contributory negligence. Thus, whereas Mr. Justice Holmes in Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. v. Goodman laid down a rule "once for all" that failure
to stop, look, and listen at a railroad crossing when the view was
obstructed is contributory negligence per se,6 7 the Florida Court repudiated the same rule in 1948.68 Likewise the older Florida cases
established that one who ran into a standing train was barred from
recovery, despite the comparative negligence statute applicable to
railroad accidents, since the plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of his own injuries. 9 The question of the extent of such
contributory negligence has recently been held to be one for the
jury. 70 The negligence per se approach recently has been rejected by
a federal court applying Florida law in a case involving the overdriving
of headlights. 71 Likewise jay-walking in violation of statute has been
held not to be negligence per se.7 2 In summation, a commentator's recent description of the negligence per se approach in range of vision
cases as a "waning rule of law' 73 seems to be an accurate portrayal of
the Florida Court's attitude toward negligence per se in general.
In most American jurisdictions the negligence per se rule is

66See, e.g., Surico v. Deutsch, 8 Fla. Supp. 24 (1955).
67Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927). The per se approach was
rejected by the Court only six years later. Pokora v. Wabash R.R., 292 U.S. 98
(1933).
6sSeaboard Air Line Ry. v. Boles, 160 Fla. 910, 37 So.2d 578 (1948), 2 U. FLA. L.
REV. 443 (1949).
69Kimball v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 132 Fla. 235, 181 So. 533 (1938); Clark v.
Atlantic C.L.R.R., 141 Fla. 155, 192 So. 621 (1939).
'OHorton v. Louisville & N.R.R., 61 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1952); see Note, 7 U. FLA.

L.

311 (1954).
7'Nesbit v. Everette, 227 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1955), 9 U. FLA. L.

REV.

REV. 234 (1956);
accord, Townsend Sash Door & Lumber Co. v. Silas, 82 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1955).
72Coleman v. Phipps, 82 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1955).
739 U. FLA. L. REV. 234 (1956).
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also applied in cases involving violation of safety statutes74 on the
ground that, the standard having been set by the legislature, "jurors
have no dispensing power to relax it."5 In a number of these jurisdictions, the rule is currently being softened by the doctrine of "justifiable violation," 76 or by finding that the legislature did not intend
the statute to apply to the situation under considerationY7 This
finding is not too difficult to make because of the paucity, at state
level, of records showing legislative intent. This particular problem
has not been as acute in Florida, due to a judicially promulgated
double standard for determining the effect of violation of criminal
statutes in negligence cases. Thus, while the Court has followed
the majority view in holding that violation of statutes not relating
to motor vehicles is negligence per se,78 in the case of motor vehicles
laws a violation is regarded only as prima facie evidence of negligence. 79 As a result, in automobile accident cases statutory violations
usually go to the jury, which, in the words of one writer, "will exercise its function - in the generality
of cases - so as to expand liability
80
defense."
the
down
cut
and
Willful, Wanton, or Reckless Misconduct Exception
Another method of avoiding the defense of contributory negligence is by categorizing the defendant's conduct as willful, wanton,
or reckless. 81 An early Florida case took cognizance of this possibility,82 but absence of any reference to it in later cases, other than
those involving the Automobile Guest Statute, 83 indicates that this

device is little used in Florida. However, in one fairly recent case
74Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920); PROssER, ToRTs 161 (2d
ed. 1955).
7rCardozo, J., in Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 169, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (1920).
76See James, Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L.

REv. 95, 117-20 (1950).
77Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N.Y. 124, 19 N.E.2d 987 (1989).

7sHoskins v. Jackson Grain Company, 63 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1958) (seed labeling
statute).
79A~len v. Hooper, 126 Fla. 458, 171 So. 513 (1987); Miami v. Thigpen, 151 Fla.
800, 803, 11 So.2d 800, 801 (1943) (dictum).
8ojames, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 724 (1953). To the same
effect see Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REv. 317, 840
(1914).
sljames, Contributory Negligence, 62 YA. L.J. 691, 709-12 (1958).
82Florida Sou. Ry. v. Hirst, 80 Fla. 1, 39, 11 So. 506, 513 (1892) (dictum).
83FLA. STAT.

§320.59 (1957).
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involving injury inflicted on a landowner's child by an allegedly
negligent trespasser, the Court held that the defense of contributory
negligence was unavailable to the trespasser, even though the trespass
itself was not deliberate and the suit was being brought by the child
84
for his injuries rather than by the landowner himself.
The Automobile Guest Statute bars actions by automobile guests

against their hosts in the absence of "gross negligence or willful and
wanton misconduct by the owner or operator ....
".85 By also providing that the issue of such misconduct "shall in all cases be solely
for the jury," 86 however, the legislature has seen to it that most of the
guest cases will get to the jury; and the Florida Court has seemingly
interpreted the phrase gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct to be something less culpable than the "recklessness" defined
by the American Law Institute as differing in kind from negligence.-s
At the same time, the Florida Court has indicated that contributory
negligence will be a defense even to misconduct that will take a
case out of the Guest Statute.", However, because the issue of contributory negligence will also normally be decided by the jury, the
tendency of the jury to disregard instructions and "do equity" as they
see it can still operate.
Is the solution of relaxing judicial control and sending more cases
to the jury8 9 in the hope that they will disregard the letter of the law
84St. Petersburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cuccinello, 44 So.2d 670 (Fla. 1950),
4 U. FLA. L. REV. 125 (1951). RESTATEMENT, TORTS §380, comment c (1934), is in
accord in holding a trespasser to land liable to members of the landowner's household regardless of whether his conduct would create liability if he were not a
trespasser.
1

S FLA. STAT.

§320.59 (1957).

861bid.
87RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §500 (1934); see Silliman, Standard of Care Under the
Florida Guest Statute, 27 FLA. BAR J. 298 (1953); Note, 4 U. FLA. L. REV. 79 (1951);
9 U. FLA. L. REV. 232 (1956). But for a recent case extending coverage of the statute
to include a guest while outside the automobile, see Fishback v. Yale, 85 So.2d 142
(Fla. 1955), 9 U. FLA. L. REv. 235 (1956).
SSHenley v. Carter, 63 So.2d 192 (Fla. 1953).
S9Modern developments in two other rules of law sometimes result in getting
additional cases to the jury. The joint enterprise doctrine is most often used to
impute the contributory negligence of an automobile driver to his passengers, and
therefore tends to restrict rather than expand liability in such cases. Nevertheless
there is one way in which this doctrine is sometimes used to extend liability. It is
generally held that the doctrine cannot be used in actions among the parties to a
joint enterprise to impute the negligence of the driver to his co-enterprisers.
Whiddon v. Malone, 220 Ala. 220, 124 So. 516 (1949); Perry v. Ryback, 302 Pa. 559,
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a sound one? Perhaps from a utilitarian point of view it may produce
the socially desirable result of better loss distribution. But there still
will remain a considerable group of cases in which the courts will feel
obliged to find contributory negligence as a matter of law, thus
placing the entire burden of the loss on the injured plaintiff.90 In
addition, despite the fact that most jurors can be counted on to disregard their oaths in order to do justice as they see it, there will always
be some juries that will respect the law as charged by the court and
refuse to apportion the loss as conscience dictates.
Moreover, there is something basically wrong with a rule of law
that is so contrary to the settled convictions of the lay community that
laymen will almost always refuse to enforce it, even when solemnly
told to do so by a judge whose instructions they have sworn to follow.
Service as jurors is the only formal point of contact with the judicial
system for many, if not most, of the citizens concerned. What sort of
an opinion of that system is engendered by the instructions they receive in negligence cases? As one prominent Pennsylvania attorney
has put it, "it breeds contempt for law in general and it breeds contempt for judges and lawyers." 9'
There are those who argue that the contributory negligence rule
should not be changed because the jury will apply comparative negligence anyhow, and the rule is needed as a check on the jury. 92 But
the disrespect for law engendered by putting our citizens in a position
153 At. 770 (1931);
RSTATEMENT, TORTS §491, comment c (1934). But a joint
enterprise is incompatible with a host-guest relationship. Thus the joint enterprise
doctrine may be used to avoid the adverse effect of an automobile guest statute
and place liability of the driver to his passengers on an ordinary negligence basis.
Bradley v. Clarke, 118 Conn. 641, 174 At. 72 (1934); Pence v. Berry, 13 Wash.2d
564, 125 P.2d 645 (1942); see Note, 7 U. FLA. L. REv. 69 (1954).
The attractive nuisance doctrine, though not directly related to the defense of
contributory negligence, also results in getting more cases to the jury by imposing a
duty on landowners to protect trespassing children. The law of negligence is thus
extended into an area in which landowners were traditionally immune from
liability. For a discussion of the development of the attractive nuisance doctrine
in Florida, see Note, 1 U. FLA. L. REv. 271 (1948).
90"Jurymen will do a little wrong in order to do a great right. They endeavour
to do justice without regard to strict law. A judge, bound by precedent, must tread
the straight and narrow path." Jacobs, Trial by Jury -Its Origin and Merits, 21
Ausr. L.J. 462, 463 (1948).
OlEldredge, Contributory Negligence: An Outmoded Defense That Should Be
Abolished, 43 A.B.A.J. 52, 53 (1957).
92Powell, Contributory Negligence: A Necessary Check on the American Jury,
43 A.BA.J. 1105 (1957).
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in which they feel it is necessary to deliberately violate the law is not
something to be lightly brushed aside; and it comes ill from the
mouths of lawyers, who as officers of the courts have sworn to uphold
the law, to defend the present system by arguing that it works because
jurors can be trusted to disregard that very law.9 3
Intelligent instructions authorizing jurors to apportion damages
in cases involving contributory negligence would change jury cynicism and disrespect to respect for our courts and judicial system.
Would the price in dollars to be paid by society for this respect be too
high? There are those who argue that it would. 9 4 It is therefore ap-

propriate at this point to examine the development of the alternative
comparative negligence approach and see how it is working in jurisdictions that have adopted it.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE DOC-RINE

Other Countries
The concept of dividing or apportioning damages when both defendant and plaintiff were at fault probably originated in fourteenth
century maritime law, although some writers claim to find traces of
it in early Roman law. 95 Thus the Laws of Oleron, an island off the
west coast of France, as compiled in 1344, provided for an equal division of damages in case of collision between two ships when it was
impossible to fix the blame for the collision. 91 On the other hand,
the Consulato del Mare, a compilation of Spanish decisions published
at about the same time, provided for apportionment of damages according to the conscience of "experienced men, who are well and
accurately versed in the art of the sea." 97 The Laws of Oleron became
9SIbid.; Harkavy, Comparative Negligence, 43 A.B.A.J. 1115 (1957). But apparently most experts in the tort field favor the apportionment approach. See
Eldredge, supra note 91, at 53, indicating that an informal poll of the Committee
on Torts of the American Law Institute unanimously opposed the rule of contributory negligence and unanimously favored apportionment of damages.
4Benson, Can New York State Afford Comparative Negligence?, 27 N.Y. STATE
BAR BuLL. 291 (1955).

95Hillyer, Comparative Negligence in Louisiana, 11 TUL. L. REV. 112, 120-21
(1936). This position is strongly opposed by Turk, Comparative Negligence on the
March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 189, 216-18 (1950).
96ARTIcLEs OF OLERON art. XV, as reproduced in summary form in SANBORN,
ORIGINS OF THE EARLY ENGLISH MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAw 66 (1930).
97CONSULATO DEL MARE C. 157, a translation of which is reproduced in Turk,

supra note 95, at 223, n.88.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss2/1

18

Maloney: From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A NeededReform
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

a part of the common law of the Atlantic ports, 98 and probably from
them the idea of equal division found its way into English admiralty
law. Meanwhile the Consulato del Mare, with its concept of apportionment according to the degree of fault of the parties, became a
part of the admiralty law of the Mediterranean countries. 99 The first
English admiralty case involving equal division in which fault was
expressly found on both sides was decided in 1706.100 The rule of
equal division was followed in England until the adoption of the apportionment according to fault principle by the Maritime Convention Act of 1911.101 Most important maritime nations follow the latter
rule today,102 although the United States still clings to the equal
division rule adopted from earlier English admiralty law. 0 3
The inherent superiority and justice of the doctrine of apportionment of damages in cases involving accidents resulting from joint
op. cit. supra note 96, at 70.
091d. at 86.
10ONoden v. Ashton, Libels, File 128, No. 250, Ass. Bk., June 20, 1706, noted
in MAPSDEN, COLLISIONS AT SRA 143 (10th ed., McGuflie 1953).
1ol & 2 GEo. 5, c. 57, §1.
l02BEaNmir, AMERICAN ADMIRALTY 4 (6th ed., Knauth 1941) lists ratifications and
adherences to the Brussels Maritime Convention of 1909-10 containing the same
apportionment provisions as the English act. According to Benedict, as of 1940,
98SANBORN,

82 nations and the British, French, Portugese and German empires were committed
to the Convention.
103Turk, supra note 95, at 231-38. 4 BENEmir, AME.ICAN ADMIRALTY 49 (Supp.
1948), points out that the United States Senate held hearings on the Brussels
Maritime Convention, and reported favorably on it in June 1989; but World War
II intervened and the Convention was finally withdrawn from further consideration
in 1947. There are indications, however, that the federal courts are becoming
dissatisfied with the equal division rule. In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 99 F.
Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa. 1951), the district court refused to halve damages for personal
injuries and reduced them by only 17 %, the extent to which the plaintiff's
negligence contributed to his injuries, on the ground that the rule of equal
division was traditionally applicable to property damage but not binding as to
personal injuries. The court of appeals, while somewhat critical of the method
of division, affirmed the judgment, 198 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1952), and the Supreme
Court affirmed without discussing the basis for apportionment, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
And in Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., 127 F. Supp. 469 (E.D.
La. 1954), the district court applied the equal division rule to property damage
resulting from an explosion on a gasoline barge, but diminished recovery for
personal injuries of two seamen against the owner of the terminal facilities by only
5%, which was found to be the extent of their negligent contribution to the explosion. The court of appeals affirmed on this point, 230 F.2d 846 (5th Cir.), and
certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court sub. nom. Gulf Refining Co. v. Black
Warrior Towing Co., 852 U.S. 832 (1956).
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negligence has led to its incorporation in the codes of Austria, France,
Germany, Portugal, and Switzerland;104 and it has been adopted by
judicial interpretation in Italy.' ° The modern European developments are detailed in an excellent series of articles by Turk,1 0 6 who
points out that the apportionment rule has also been adopted in
1°
China, Japan, Persia, Poland, Russia, Siam, and Turkey. 0
Likewise Englandlos and all of the Canadian Provinceso 9 provide
for apportionment in negligence cases. Saskatchewan has an Automobile Insurance Act providing for compensation without regard to
fault;11 ° but if an injured party is not satisfied with the compensation
award, he may bring a negligence action in which the amount of
compensation received under the Automobile Insurance Act will be
credited against any judgment he may recover. The Saskatchewan
comparative negligence statute11 applies to such actions.
Early American Developments

To what extent has the comparative negligence doctrine been

lo4The statutes are collected and discussed in Turk, supra note 95, at 240-42.

10Id. at 243.
1o-Turk, supra note 95, at 238-44.
1071d. at 242, n.97. The statutes of the countries enumerated (with the exception of Russia) are discussed in 6 SCHLEGELBERGER, RECHTVERGLEICHENDES HANDWORTERBucH 131 (1938). As in Italy, the Russian development has apparently been
judicial rather than statutory. Schlegelberger points out that the statutes of a
number of these countries, including Poland, Portugal, and Switzerland, are phrased
in terms of comparative causation rather than comparative fault, and that under
them damages may be apportioned on the basis of causation not only in negligence
cases but also in cases of intentional torts and situations in which the plaintiff's
injuries were inflicted without fault or blame on the part of either party. Id. at 13133.
10SLaw Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945, 8 & 9 GEo. 6, c. 28.
109ALTA. REV. STAT. C. 56 (1955); B.C. REV. STAT. c. 68 (1948); MAN. REV. STAT.
c. 266, §4 (1954); NEWF. REV. STAT. C. 159 (1952); N.B. REV. STAT. c. 36 (1952); N.S.
REV. STAT. c. 51 (1954); ONT. REV. STAT. c. 252, §§4, 5 (1950); P.E.I. REV. STAT.
c. 30 (1951); SASK. REV. STAT. c. 83 (1953), as amended, SASK. STAT. c. 30, §§9a, b
(1957). There is no statutory provision in Quebec, but the doctrine has been
judicially promulgated. Wawanesa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Boucher, [1956] Que. Q.B. 705;
C.P.R. Ry. v. Frechette, 24 Que. 459 (K.B.), rev'd, [1915] A.C. 871, with dictum
recognizing the "faute commune" doctrine; Nichols Chem. Co. v. Lefebvre, 42 Can.
Sup. Ct. 402 (1909).
1l0The Automobile Accident Insurance Act, SASK. REV. STAT. c. 371 (1953); see
Green, Automobile Accident Insurance Legislation in the Province of Saskatchewan,
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accepted in the United States? Study of the laws of the various
jurisdictions reveals much more widespread employment of the doctrine than is generally realized. And in addition to judicial and legislative development of the apportionment of damages approach, an
ill-starred attempt to develop a different type of comparative negligence doctrine was undertaken by the Supreme Court of Illinois just
12
a century ago.
Using as authority the case of Raisin v. Mitchell1"3 and another
English case in which the court had refused to apply the contributory
negligence doctrine against a seven-year-old boy who climbed into
defendant's unattended horse cart on the ground that the child's
"misconduct bears no proportion to that of the defendant,"31 4 the
Illinois court, in Galena & Chicago Union Railroad v. Jacobs, refused
to apply the contributory negligence doctrine on the ground that
"the degrees of negligence must be measured and considered, and
whenever it shall appear that the plaintiff's negligence is comparatively
slight, and that of the defendant gross, he shall not be deprived of
his action." '" 5
Under this approach, the negligence of the parties was compared,
and if that of the defendant was substantially greater than that of
the plaintiff, he was entitled to recover full damages. The doctrine
was followed for a short time in Kansas also,116 but was soon abandoned in both states.". 7 The requirement of finding degrees of negligence added new complications to the already complicated law of
negligence, and proved unworkable18 It has also been suggested that
although the doctrine was found acceptable in a series of early railroad cases, with an increase in industrial accident cases the court
perhaps reassessed the ability of these new defendants to bear the
31 J. Comp.LEG. & INT'L LAW 39 (3d ser. 1949), reprinted in LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE
IN THE CIVIL LAW 315-35 (1950).
"'2SAsK. REv.STAT. c. 83 (1953).
112See Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. REv. 36, 45, 54 (1944).
1139 Car. & P. 613, 173 Eng. Rep. 979 (C.P. 1939); see note 30 supra and dis-

cussion in accompanying text.
'i4Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q.B. 29, 39, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041, 1044 (1841).
"1520 IIl. 478, 497 (1858).
116Pacific R.R. v. Houts, 12 Kan. *328 (1873); Sawyer v. Sauer, 10 Kan. *466
(1872).
'"7Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. v.
Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Morgan, 31
"'SGreen, Illinois Negligence Law,
Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. CALF. L.

Hessions, 150 IlL. 546, 37 N.E. 905 (1894);
Kan. 77, 1 Pac. 298 (1883).
39 ILL. L. REV. 36, 45, 54 (1944); see Elliot,
REV. 91, 136 (1933).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1958

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1958], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
loss and abandoned the doctrine in order to afford them greater
protection."19
At about the same time that the Illinois scheme of comparing
negligences for the purpose of determining entire liability was getting
under way, the State of Georgia embarked on a comparative negligence
development that was partly judicial and partly legislative. In a series
of cases beginning in 1851120 and based in part on the English case of
Lynch v. Nurdinl2l (also used as authority by the Illinois court), the
Georgia Supreme Court approved the concept of apportioning damages
"where both parties are in fault, but the defendant most so.""12 In
one of these early cases the court also suggested a sort of reverse
application of the last clear chance doctrine, under which a plaintiff
who failed to use a reasonable opportunity to avoid the consequences
of the defendant's negligence would not have his damages apportioned
but would be completely barred from recovery."23 These developments were probably the basis for two statutes that first appeared in
a codification of Georgia law in the Georgia Code of 1860-62.124 The
first of these provides for apportionment of damages in actions against
railroad companies in which the complainant is contributorily negligent;12 5 and the second, while somewhat ambiguous, has been interpreted as codifying the application of the last clear chance doctrine
in lieu of comparative negligence when either defendant or plaintiff
126
had the last chance to avoid the accident.
The fact that the comparative negligence statute grew out of a
series of railroad decisions 127 perhaps explains why it refers only to
11Green, supra note 118, at 51. Malone attributes the failure of Louisiana to
develop a comparative negligence doctrine in part to a similar desire to protect a
growing street railway system. Malone, Comparative Negligence, 6 LA. L. REv.
125, 138-40 (1945).
12OMacon & W. R.R. v. Winn, 26 Ga. 250, 254 (1858) (dictum).
1211 Q.B. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841).
12"Flanders v. Meath, 27 Ga. 358, 362 (1859) (dictum).
12Macon & W.R.R. v. Winn, 19 Ga. 440 (1856).
"24GA. CODE §§2979, 2914 (1860-62); see Turk, supra note 95, at 327.
125GA. CODE ANN. §94-703 (1937).
1261d. §105-603. The use of the last clear chance doctrine in such cases is
criticized in Hilkey, Doctrine of Last Clear Chance in Georgia, 13 GA. B.J. 104
(1950); The Last Clear Chance Doctrine in Florida and Georgia, 28 FLA. B.J. 24
(1954).
12"These code sections were apparently added by the commissioners who prepared the Code of 1860-62 rather than having their genesis in the legislature.
Turk, supra note 95, at 327-30, believes the commissioners felt they were simply
codifying the case law of the time.
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railroad accidents. But the Georgia court has applied the statutory
doctrine to automobile accidents 28s as well as other types of negligence not involving railroads, 129 so that by a species of judicial legislation it has apparently become applicable to all types of negligence
cases. At the same time, however, the doctrine has been unnaturally
limited by the plaintiff's last clear chance limitation,130 a limitation
that has been justly criticized for its restrictive effect in comparative
negligence cases.131
FloridaDevelopments

The Georgia development has important ramifications for Florida
because the Georgia comparative negligence statute was adopted verbatim by the Florida legislature in 1887.132 As in Georgia, its adoption
was preceded by a railroad case involving contributory negligence,
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Yniestra.33 Unlike the Georgia court,

the Supreme Court of Florida considered itself barred by the strict
134
contributory negligence doctrine as set out in Butterfield v. Forester,
which the Court cited as authority in denying recovery to a contributorily negligent pedestrian run down by an engine backing without
a rear light. In the opinion, Chief Justice McWhorter castigated the
all-or-nothing rule, which he labeled "unjust and inequitable. 135
In calling upon the legislature to provide for apportionment of
damages, the Chief Justice did not suggest that apportionment be
limited to railroad accident cases. But the Georgia statute was at
hand and would remedy the specific injustice complained of. It was
enacted at the next session of the legislature, and no doubt it adequately covered the most serious type of negligence case arising in
281Barnett v. Whatley, 87 Ga. App. 860, 75 S.E.2d 667 (Div. 1, 1953); Cox v. Nix,
87 Ga. App. 837, 75 S.E.2d 331 (Div. 2, 1953); McDowall Transport, Inc. v. Gault,
80 Ga. App. 445, 56 S.E.2d 161 (Div. 1, 2, 1949).
lZDWynne v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 159 Ga. 623, 126 S.E. 388 (1925)
(invitee in building); Elk Cotton Mills v. Grant, 140 Ga. 727, 79 S.E. 836 (1913)
(employee in factory).
IsoMacon & W.R.R. v. Winn, 19 Ga. 440 (1856).
isiGREGORY,

LEGISLATVE

Loss

DISTRIBUTION

IN

NEGLIGENCE

AaIONS

126-34

(1936); Hilkey, supra note 126 (both articles).
132Fla. Laws 1887, c. 3744, now FLA. STAT. §768.06 (1957).
13321 Fla. 700 (1886).

13411 East 59, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809), discussed under heading "Origin
of the Contributory Negligence Rule" supra,
13521 Fla. at 737.
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Florida at the time of its passage. As other types of cases involving
industrial and, later, automobile accidents came to the fore, however,
the Florida Court, less inclined toward judicial legislation than its
sister court to the north, did not extend the statute beyond the railroad cases specifically covered by it, and the contributory negligence
defense remained available in these other cases. 136 It should be noted
in passing, however, that the Florida legislature, while taking the
Georgia railroad comparative negligence statute as its pattern, did not
adopt the companion legislation causing the last clear chance doctrine
to defeat recovery when applicable. 137 And the Florida Court, after
first applying the last clear chance doctrine to allow an extremely
negligent plaintiff full recovery,138 has recently adopted the sounder
view that the doctrine has no application to cases in which the com9
parative negligence statute is involved.13
If the members of the legislature of 1887 could have foreseen the
flood of automobile accident cases in which injured plaintiffs would
be denied relief against admittedly culpable defendants because of the
harsh application of the contributory negligence rule, it seems likely
that, heeding the plea of Chief Justice McWhorter that "the law, in
cases at least where human life is concerned, certainly needs legislative revision,' 140 they would have included such cases within the
coverage of the statute. Legislators are not always prescient, however,
and the opportunity was lost. But the words of the Chief Justice are
as appropriate today as they were in 1887, and the 1959 Legislature
might well ask itself whether the time has not come to apply them to
the automobile, a newer and far more dangerous 141 mode of transportation than the railroads of 1887.142
136Macasphalt Corp. v. Murphy, 67 So.2d 438 (Fla. 1953); Petroleum Carrier
Corp. v. Robbins, 52 So.2d 666 (Fla. 1951). In Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Ward,
102 Fla. 1105, 137 So. 163 (1931), the Court considered and rejected the Georgia
argument for extending the railroad comparative negligence statute to motor
carriers.
13GA. CODE ANN.

§105-603 (1956). See note 126 supra.

138Poindexter v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 56 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1951).
139Loftin v. Nolin, 86 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1956), 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 339 (1955).
34oLouisville & N.R.R. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700, 738 (1886).
'See notes 1, 2 supra. For further development of the argument that this
element of danger calls for the extension of comparative negligence to motor vehicle accidents, see Note, 2 U. FLA. L. REV. 124 (1949).
142The element of danger was apparently the basis for the enactment of Florida's
other comparative negligence statute applicable to employees in certain specified
hazardous occupations. FLA. STAT. §§769.01-.06 (1957).
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Other American Legislation
The injustice worked by the defense of contributory negligence in
railroad accidents led in 1906 to another type of statute, the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, designed to protect interstate railroad employees injured by the negligence of their employers. 143 This federal
statute soon became the pattern for similar legislation protecting
intra-state railroad employees. Similar statutes are now found in at
least twenty-three states,144 while several additional states have even
broader statutes covering employees of railroads and those in other
occupations. 145
While the railroads bore the brunt of the earlier legislative attacks
on contributory negligence, bills currently being introduced are of
broader scope and provide for adoption of the comparative negligence
approach in all types of negligence cases. Thus, in addition to the
4
judicial extension of the comparative negligence doctrine in Georgia,1 6
five states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico now have compara1 47
tive negligence statutes applicable to all types of negligence cases.
The first, and simplest, of these statutes was enacted in Mississippi
in 1910.148 Nebraska came next, enacting a statute providing for apportionment of damages when plaintiff's negligence is slight and defendant's is gross in comparison. 49 This statute was duplicated in
South Dakota in 1941.150 Wisconsin's statute, enacted in 1931,1 5' is
implemented by the use of special verdictsIs 2 and is applicable when
14335 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §51 (1952). On the federal level
the same principle was later written into the Merchant Marine, or Jones, Act, 41
STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1952), and the act relating to death on the high
seas, 41 STAT. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §766 (1952).
' 4 4See note 42 supra.
'45E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§73-914 to 919, 81-1201 to 1203, 81-1208 (1947); CAL.
LAB. CODE ANN. §2801 (West 1955); ORE. REV. STAT. §§654.305-.335 (1955).
146See notes 122-131 supra and accompanying text.
147ARK. STAT. ANN. §§27-1730.1, .2 (Supp. 1957); MIss. CODE ANN. §1454 (1957);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §25-1151 (1956); S.D. CODE §47.0304-1 (Supp. 1952); Wis. STAT.
§331.045 (1955); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §5141 (Supp. 1957).
'4SMiss. Laws 1910, c. 135. The statute originally covered only personal injuries. It was extended to injuries to property by Laws 1920, c. 312.
149The Nebraska statute was adopted in 1913. Neb. Laws 1913, c. 124, §1.
15oS.D. Laws 1941, c. 160, §1.
15'Wis. Laws 1931, c. 242.
52
' See INsTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 103
(1955); Hayes, New York Should Adopt a Comparative Negligence Rule, 27 N.Y.
STATE BAR Ass'N BULL. 288, 289 (1955).
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plaintiff's negligence is not as great as defendant's. Arkansas enacted
a statute of general application in 1955153 that specifically required
special verdicts, but in 1957 the Arkansas legislature did away with
this requirement while adding the Wisconsin limitation that plaintiff
in order to recover must be less negligent than defendant.154 Puerto
Rico enacted the most recent statute in 1956.155 Moreover, since 1951
across-the-board comparative negligence legislation has been introduced
in the legislatures of at least eighteen states'5 6 and seriously considered in at least three more. 57 All of this activity indeed indicates
that comparative negligence is "on the march."158
OBJECTIONS TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE LEGISLATION

Why is it, then, that the march is so slow? What is it that impedes
the adoption of comparative negligence legislation in Florida and
other states where comparative negligence bills are introduced in almost every session of the legislature?
One factor is the general inertia and resistance to change that are
encountered whenever substantial changes in the law are proposed.
Advocates of the status quo tell us that the jury handles the majority
of such cases adequately now (albeit in the teeth of the instructions
they receive), so why rock the boat?' 59
This same group argues that the contributory negligence rule
serves "as a salutary check on the gambling instincts of the litigating
public160 and makes dire predictions about the increase in litigation
153Ark. Acts 1955, No. 191. A symposium on the prospective operation of this
short-lived version of the Arkansas law may be found in 10 ARK. L. REV. 54-113
(1956).
'54AR . STAT. ANN. §§27-1730.1-.2 (Supp. 1957).

155P.R.

LAWS ANN.

§5141 (Supp. 1957).

156Ala., Ariz., Ark. (where the legislation was successfully enacted), Calif., Colo.,
Fla., Kan., Mass., Mich., Mo., N.Y., N.D., Ohio, Ore., Pa., Tenn., Wash. See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 9 (1955); Lipscomb,
Comparative Negligence, 1951 INs. L.J. 667, 674.
157Ky., N.D., Okla.; see INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE 9 (1955).
15SSee
Turk, supra note 95, at 304.
159Benson, Comparative Negligence -Boon or Bane, 23 INS. COUNSEL J. 204
(1956); Harkavy, supra note 93; Powell, supra note 92, at 1005.
'GOBenson, supra note 159, at 214. But plaintiffs are not the only gamblers. The
present system arguably encourages defendants to litigate cases when there is hope
that the court will apply the contributory negligence rule to bar recovery. See
Averbach, Comparative Negligence Legislation, 19 ALBANY L. REv. 4, 17 (1955).
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that would follow a switch to the comparative negligence approach.' 61
The contributory negligence rule has even been eulogized by one
writer as "the last bar ... to complete chaos in our courts."162
Another objection raised by the same writer is perhaps more informative. This author, the superintendant of claims of a large
casualty company, and the powerful group he represents fear that
"the average verdict and settlement will have to be greater."' 63 The
validity of this claim will be examined later. The opposition of this
group,' 64 and of other perennial defendants who are rarely on the
plaintiff's side of negligence litigation,165 has to date been effective in
Florida, as elsewhere, in blocking comparative negligence legislation.
An additional objection is that the contributory negligence rule
should be retained for its deterrent effect in connection with accident
prevention. But if the fear of serious personal injury and perhaps
death is not sufficient to prevent contributory negligence, it seems
highly unlikely that the more remote fear of losing a personal injuries
suit will be a real deterrent to negligent driving.66
A final argument against comparative negligence is that the doctrine would be so complicated to administer that the average jury
would not be competent to apply it and would simply bring in a compromise verdict.'7 Although this contention has some basis, as will be
pointed out, not all comparative negligence legislation is equally open
lelBenson, supra note 159, at 207. See also Benson, Can New York State Afford
Comparative Negligence?, 27 N.Y. STATE BAR BULL. 291, 298-99 (1955).
lezBenson, ComparativeNegligence -Boon or Bane, 23 INS. COUNSEL J. 204, 214
(1956).
'63Benson, Can New York State Afford Comparative Negligence?, 27 N.Y. STATE
BAR BULL. 291, 299 (1955); see Powell, supra note 159, at 1007.
'64To quote Robert N. Gilmore, Jr., Assistant Counsel, Association of Casualty
and Surety Companies, an association of 133 stock companies, "Our Association is
opposed to comparative negligence in any form ... " Gilmore, Comparative Negligence from a Viewpoint of Casualty Insurance, 10 ARK. L. REv. 82 (1955).

265"The law of contributory negligence favors corporate defendants, insurance
companies, and public utilities. They are not subject to the denial of justice which
a strict application of the rule produces, as they do not come into court in the
capacity of a plaintiff ....
Their opposition . . . will be strenuous." Note, 17
TEMPLE L.Q. 276, 286 (1943).

1661t is also true that there is a growing tendency to recognize that the compensatory function of tort law in automobile accident cases outweighs the admonitory function. See Leflar, Negligence in Name Only, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 564
(1952).
' 67Benson, Comparative Negligence-Boon or Bane, 23 INS. COUNSEL J. 204
(1956).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1958

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1958], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
to this criticism; and there are ways of meeting and minimizing this
objection.16s
Answers to the Objections
Before the workability of the various types of comparative negligence statutes is considered, it may be appropriate to evaluate the
other objections and consider the benefits which would be derived
from such legislation.
As previously noted, the fact that the jury uses a comparative negligence approach in most situations in which the plaintiff was contributorily negligent is not an adequate reason for preserving the contributory negligence rule. Leaving aside the cases in which juries literally
follow their instructions and deny recovery, 169 retention of the existing rule leads laymen to disrespect and ridicule our system of accident law. This is a high price to pay for the status quo when comparative negligence legislation would bring the law into line with
the realities of jury operation and change that disrespect to respect
0
for the justice administered by our courts."

Moreover, there are sound reasons for believing that adoption of
the comparative negligence rule would decrease rather than increase
negligence litigation. The University of Chicago Jury Study Project
has indicated,171 and even some opponents of comparative negligence
admit, 17 2 that when the measure of damages is the sole issue, judges

are likely to be as liberal as juries in assessing damages. The real
reason for plaintiffs' demands for jury trial in many cases today is
not so much the hope of a larger award by the jury as the fear that
the judge will apply the contributory negligence rule literally, whereloSSee discussion under heading "Use of Special Verdicts" infra.
169"[T]he reports abound in cases where the jury has been extremely literal
in interpreting the judge's charge . . . to the detriment of the plaintiff." Averbach,
supra note 160, at 11. (Mr. Averbach is a trial lawyer of 30 years' experience and
former President of the International Academy of Trial Lawyers). In addition, as
Dean Prosser points out, supra note 55, at 469, "there are many directed verdict
cases, where the plaintiff's negligence, however slight it may be in comparison with
that of the defendant, is still clear beyond dispute, and the court has no choice
but to declare it as a matter of law."
l70See notes 91-93 supra and accompanying text.
171KALVEN,

REPORT ON THE JURY PROJECT, CONFERENCE ON

AINTS AND METHODS OF

29-31 (Univ. of Mich. Law School 1955).
1 Benson, Can New York State Afford Comparative Negligence?, 27 N.Y.

LEGAL RESEARCt
72

STATE

BAR BULL. 291, 298 (1955).
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as jurymen will probably apportion damages according to the fault
of the parties as they see it.17 3 Under comparative negligence, not only
would more cases now being tried before juries be submitted to
judges, thus substantially cutting down the time required for adjudication of cases,' 7 4 but if defendants were deprived of the hope of
avoiding recovery through the application of the contributory negligence rule, there would be a tendency to settle these cases, thus decreasing the percentage of cases tried. This has apparently been the
experience with comparative negligence legislation in Wisconsin,
where, to quote a past president of that state's bar, the number of
negligence cases tried "has been vastly decreased."' 175
The same authority indicates that the fear that the size of verdicts
would increase under comparative negligence apparently has not been
borne out in Wisconsin, 176 and it is interesting to note that insurance
counsel who make this argument 77 fail to produce statistics to support their claims, although they are in the best position to obtain
statistics as to whether the facts bear out their claims.
Is the comparative negligence rule too complex to be properly administered by a jury? Juries have been making apportionments on
the basis of comparative negligence with apparent success in Florida
in railway accident cases since 1887;178 and in Wisconsin they have
been applying the rule to all types of negligence cases, apparently to
the complete satisfaction of the Wisconsin bar, since 193.17 9 Florida
juries have also been successfully apportioning damages in automobile
accident cases in which the accident occurred in a comparative negligence state such as Mississippi, so that conflict of laws principles have
173See Bress, Comparative Negligence, 43 A.BA.J. 127, 130 (1957).
174INSTrrUTE

OF

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION,

JURISDICTION CALENDAR STATUS STUDY-

STATE TRIAL

COURTS

or

GENERAL

1956, pp. 2, 5, indicates that the average

number of months elapsing from "at issue" to trial in jury cases in Kings County,
N.Y., was 26 months, in nonjury cases 4 months; in New York County in jury cases
41 months, in nonjury cases 3 months; in Queens County in jury cases 46 months,
in nonjury cases 16 months; and in Bronx County in jury cases 39 months, whereas

the nonjury calendar was completely up to date. The average delay in Dade
County, Fla., was relatively short, being 6 months for jury cases compared to 2
months for nonjury cases.
lSHayes, supra note 152, at 289.
176Bress, supra note 173, at 129, says "it is widely accepted that, with compara-

tive negligence, there has ensued a decrease in the over-all size of verdicts."
177See note 163 supra.
17SSee discussion under heading "Florida Developments" supra.
17DSee Hayes, supra note 152, at 290.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1958

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1958], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
called for application of the apportionment rule in Florida trials.1s °
The determination of the percentage of negligence attributable to
each party in such cases is perhaps not exact, 18' but apportionment can
hardly be claimed to be more speculative than establishment of the
dollar value of pain and suffering or a broken leg. Moreover, as the
opponents of comparative negligence freely admit, most juries are
making apportionments sub rosa anyhow.' 82 The real problem is
selection of the type of legislation that will be most helpful to them in
doing their job honestly and openly. In connection with the difficulty
of accurate apportionment, it is interesting to note that all the
Canadian statutes provide that when it is not possible to establish
s
different degrees of fault, liability shall be apportioned equally.'1
THE MULTIPLE PARTY PROBLEM

The difficulties in apportionment faced by a jury are of course
multiplied if the trial involves multiple parties and the jury is re-

quired to determine the respective percentages of negligence attributable to each party. The critics may be correct in suspecting that in
these cases some juries simply add up the number of acts of negligence and use this figure as the basis of apportionment. 8 4 Even this,
however, is better than no apportionment at all, with the resulting
allocation of the entire loss to the plaintiff, whose negligence may
have played only a minor part in causing his injuries. Theoretical
practice would no doubt be best served by bringing all the parties
in a multiple party accident into the same suit, determining the proportion of fault of each, and allocating the damages on this basis.'

85

8

OSee INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 13 (1955).
l lThe difficulty of making an exact apportionment has led to one recent proposal calling for division of damages not according to percentage of fault but

equally among all the negligent parties. O'Toole, Comparative Negligence: The
Pennsylvania Proposal, 2 VILL. L. REV. 474, 486 (1957). Prosser, supra note 55, at
475, while recognizing the difficulty, points out that it "is at least more accurate
than one based on the arbitrary conclusion that 100 per cent of the responsibility
rests with the plaintiff and none whatever with the defendant, or, if the last clear
chance is applicable, 100 per cent with the defendant and none with the plaintiff both of which are demonstrably wrong."

182See discussion under "Role of the jury" supra.
l83The Canadian statutes are collected at note 109 supra.
184Benson, Can New York State Afford Comparative Negligence?, 27 N.Y. STATE
BAR BULL. 291, 301 (1955).
185This is the approach advocated in GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN
NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS C. XIV (1936).
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The English and Canadian comparative negligence acts provide for
such joinder, 8 6 but Dean Prosser has pointed out that the jury has

practically disappeared from negligence litigation in these jurisdictions, 87 and that a skilled judge at his leisure with a transcript of
the record before him is in a position to do an adequate job of unravelling the complex problems of the multiple party suit. 8a An untrained jury without a transcript can hardly be expected to perform

as sound a job. A system frequently employing the jury, therefore, to
be workable, should make it possible to avoid forcing this difficult
problem on the jury. Fortunately, none of the American statutes re-

quire such joinder.8

9

It is true that, under American law, multiple wrongdoers are
jointly and severally liable for the injuries they cause and that the
injured party can join them in a single unit if he sees fit.180 But if he
is not required to litigate against all at once, he will do well to avoid
joinder when comparative negligence is involved. The paucity of
appellate cases involving this difficult multiple apportionment problem'0 1 probably indicates that well-represented plaintiffs are following
lBeSee Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945, 8 & 9 GEo. 6, c. 28.
Problems in the Administration of the English Act are discussed in WILLIAMS, JOINT
TORTS

AND

CoNTIBuToRY NEGLIGENCE cc. 16, 19 (1951). For the Canadian statutes

see note 109 supra. Commenting on the Ontario Act, Mole and Wilson, A Study
of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 533, 604, 653 (1932), state: "[O]ther
jurisdictions are satisfied merely to set out the statutory rule of comparative negligence and to rely upon judicial wisdom in solving the various problems of construction which naturally arise under comparative negligence, and there is no reason to
expect the courts of New York to deviate from their record of sound judgment if
the comparative negligence doctrine should be adopted in this state."
's7Prosser, supra note 55, at 504; see O'Halloran, Problems in the Modern
Appeal in Civil Cases, 27 CAN. B. REv. 259, 263 (1949).
'sProsser, supra note 55, at 506.
'19Dean Prosser, id. at 506, n.223, points out that such a proposal was rejected
in Minnesota in 1940. But see Teller, Proposed Comparative Negligence Law and
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 5 BROOKLYN BAMu. 100 (1954), criticizing a
1953 New York bill for not requiring complete adjudication of multiple party accidents in a single suit.
' 9OSee PRossER, TORTS §46 (2d ed. 1955). If the wrongdoers concurred in producing the entire injury, they are looked upon as joint tortfeasors and are held
jointly and severally liable for the whole damage. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Allen,
67 Fla. 257, 65 So. 8 (1914); Arnst v. Estes, 136 Me. 272, 8 A.2d 201 (1939). Successive wrongdoers, however, are jointly liable only as to that part of the injury
to which they both contributed. Viou v. Brooks Scanlon Lumber Co., 99 Minn.
97, 108 N.W. 891 (1906).
191As of 1953, Prosser could find only ten such cases. Prosser, Comparative
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the course of discretion and avoiding the unnecessary complications
and dangers 92 lurking in joinder of multiple defendants when comparative negligence is involved. The fact that Florida does not permit third party practice 93 would help make it possible to avoid this
problem if a system of comparative negligence were adopted.
Relationship to the Problem of ContributionAmong Tortfeasors
The problem of apportionment among multiple parties becomes
further complicated if the jurisdiction has legislation providing for
contribution among joint tortfeasors. This type of legislation is discussed in detail in the following article, but its relationship to the
comparative negligence problem may be suggested at this point. As
pointed out above, the English system effects contribution through
joinder of all negligent parties in a single action. But with the jury
involved, proposals to include a contribution provision in American
comparative negligence statutes might raise such fear of complicated
litigation as to give, in the words of Dean Prosser, "the kiss of death
194
to the whole bill."'
Moreover, the combination of a contribution statute with comparative negligence legislation might operate, in the case of insured
motorists, to defeat the apportionment of damages that seemingly
would result from a comparative negligence law. 195 Because of their
complexity and the possible undesirable side effects that would result
from contribution provisions, the wisest course, in so far as futhering

Negligence, 51 Mimi. L. REv. 465, 507 (1953).
'9 2 One obvious danger is that of reversible error in the complicated jury instructions that would be necessary in such multiple party proceedings.
19Florida Fuel Oil, Inc. v. Spring Villas, Inc., 95 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1957); Pan
American Surety Co. v. Jefferson Constr. Co., 99 So.2d 726 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
194 Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 506 (1953).
"95James offers the following example. "A and B run into each other at an
intersection. Let's assume they are equally negligent ... that each of them is hurt
Now, if you have comparative
$10,000 worth . . . [and] both are insured ....
negligence, A is entitled to recover $5,000 against B. He is hurt $10,000 worth,
but he only get $5,000 because he is half negligent, and B is entitled to recover
$5,000 against A ....
Now if his [A's] insurance company is entitled to cancel out
that $5,000 that it owes because of its policy undertaking to B, you are allowing
the insurance company to credit its insured's personal loss against the insurance
company obligation." James, Comparative Negligence, 26 UTAiH BAR BULL. 109, 118
(1956).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss2/1

32

Maloney: From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A NeededReform
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
the ends of comparative negligence legislation is concerned, is to leave
the rule against contribution in Florida as it now stands.196
Basis for Apportionment When Multiple Parties Are Involved
Even in the absence of forced contribution, the very fact that multiple parties were involved in the accident that resulted in the plaintiff's suit against one of them raises the question of whether apportionment should be made by comparing only the negligence of the
parties to the suit or by reducing the plaintiff's recovery by the
proportion that his fault bore to the total negligence of all the
parties to the accident. The few cases that have considered the
question have adopted the latter approach.197 If the comparison
196Proposed contribution legislation such as the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act has two goals. The most obvious of these is to make provision for
one wrongdoer to obtain contribution from co-tortfeasors after he has been required
to pay full compensation to an injured party. The other goal, perhaps not so
well known, is to make it possible for the injured party to settle with one such
tortfeasor without releasing his claims against the others. There are several reasons
why such settlements are desirable and in accord with the modern social policy
looking toward prompter and more adequate compensation of tortiously injured
parties. In many jurisdictions it may take years to bring a negligence case to
trial; meanwhile the injured party, who may be in dire need of funds to defray
the cost of medical and hospital attention, or for living expenses during a period
of total disability, may be very desirous of accepting a reasonable settlement offer
by the tortfeasor who was least at fault in injuring him. In addition, from the
wrongdoer's viewpoint, it may be desirable to settle the case rather than have a
potential lawsuit hanging over his head for a protracted period. If the tortfeasor
is insured, his insurance carrier will likewise be interested in closing the matter
rather than carrying the case on its records for a protracted period; thus the
carrier may be much more willing to make a reasonable settlement with the
injured party if it can be made promptly.
But in the absence of legislation most American courts still follow the rule,
which originated in the Year Books, that the release of one joint tortfeasor releases all the other joint tortfeasors. Coche v. Jennor, Hob. 66, 80 Eng. Rep. 214
(K.B. 1614); see PROssER, TORTS 243 (2d ed. 1955); Shackleford, The Joint and
Several Liability of Tortfeasors and Their Release, 46 CENT. L.J. 387, 390 (1898).

The Florida Legislature in 1957 made the use of partial releases possible by providing that the release of one tortfeasor shall not operate to release any other
tortfeasor who may be liable for the same tort. FLA. STAT. §54.28 (1957). The
statute also does away with the artificial distinction between releases and covenants
not to sue, validating both types of settlement devices, and provides for a setoff
from any judgment against co-tortfeasors. The second goal of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act has thus been achieved. The balance of the act,
providing for contribution among tortfeasors, is not needed in Florida.
197Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., 127 F. Supp. 469 (E.D.
La. 1954), modified on other grounds, 230 F.2d 346 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1958

33

Florida Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1958], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

were only between the negligence of the plaintiff and the individual
defendant sued, a sort of indirect contribution among the tortfeasors
would result, since the percentage of the plaintiff's negligence would
necessarily be higher when the fault of third parties was omitted from
consideration. 19s This approach might be more equitable as among
the tortfeasors who injured the plaintiff, 199 but it has the socially undesirable feature of placing more of the burden of loss on an injured
party who is usually in the poorest position to bear it2

0°

RULE WHEN PLAINTIFF IS MORE AT FAULT THAN DEFENDANT

A related problem concerns the advisability of limiting the injured party's recovery to cases in which his negligence is less than
that of the defendant. The English 2° 1 and Canadian 20 2 statutes contain no such limitation, nor do most of the numerous statutes of
special application discussed previously,203 such as the railroad lia-

bility statutes. On the other hand, the American statutes of general
application, those of Arkansas, 20 4 Nebraska,2 0 5 South Dakota, 20

6

and

Gulf Refining Co. v. Black Warrior Towing Co., 352 U.S. 832 (1956); Smith v.
American Oil Co., 77 Ga. App. 463, 49 S.E.2d 90 (1948); Mishoe v. Davis, 64 Ga.
App. 700, 14 S.E.2d 187 (1941); Quady v. Sickl, 260 Wis. 348, 51 N.W.2d 3 (1952);
Bohlmann v. Penn Elec. Corp., 232 Wis. 232, 286 N.W. 552 (1939).
19sIn Hartford Ace. & Indemnity Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., supra note 197, the
percentage of negligence of one of the plaintiffs was found to be 5%, this 5% being
a part of that of his employer, which was determined to be 50%, while that of
the defendant was assessed at 50%. The plaintiff was authorized to recover 95% of
the value of his injuries from the defendant. If his recovery had been reduced by
the proportion that his fault bore to that of the defendant, or 5% compared with
50%, his damages would have been reduced by 1/lth rather than 1/20th.
:OThe force of this argument is greatly reduced in jurisdictions such as Georgia
and Wisconsin, which have legislation providing for contribution among tortfeasors
in addition to a comparative negligence statute. GA. CODE ANN. §105-2012 (1956);
WIs. STAT. ANN. §§113.01-.09, 272.59, 272.61 (1958). For a detailed analysis of this
problem see GRECORY, Op cit supra note 185, c. IX.
200This will be particularly true when one of the parties to the accident is
insolvent. For the argument that the plaintiff should bear a share of the risk of
such insolvency, see GREGORY, op. cit. supra note 185, at 142-48.
2OlLaw Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945, 8 & 9 GEO. 6, c. 28.
202See note 109 supra.

o3See discussion under heading "Other American Legislation" supra.
§§27-1730.1-.2 (Supp. 1957). The original Arkansas statute
enacted in 1955 did not contain such a limitation, but it was added by the 1957
legislature.
20FNEB. REV. STAT. §25-1151 (1956).
206S.D. CODE §47.0304-1 (Supp. 1952).
204ARK. STAT. ANN.
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Wisconsin, 207 contain specific limitations of this sort; and the Georgia
Supreme Court has judicially engrafted a similar limitation into its
statute. 208 Only Mississippi 2 9 and Puerto Rico 210 have statutes with-

out such a limitation.
One of the leading authorities has referred to this limitation as
absurd,211 and it undoubtedly does defeat the policy of broader loss
distribution, which is one of the motivating forces behind comparative negligence legislation. On the other hand, as long as fault is the
basis of automobile accident liability, allowing recovery only when
the defendant is more at fault than the plaintiff is arguably more
in accord with that doctrine, whereas allowing plaintiffs to recover
in cases in which their negligence is the major responsibility for an
accident approaches closer to strict liability than liability based on
fault. Recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the
Mississippi statute by plaintiffs almost entirely responsible for their
own injuries has been criticized on this basis; 21 2 and a statute limiting
recovery to cases in which the plaintiff's fault is not as great as that
of the defendant may stand a better chance of legislative acceptance
and enactment than the Mississippi type, which has no such limitation.213

A further argument made for the limited type of statute has been
that one purpose of the comparative negligence rule is to reduce the
burden on the courts by encouraging settlement of cases now being
litigated, very often cases in which the plaintiff sues and demands a
jury trial in the hope that the jury will shut its eyes to his contributory
negligence. If the plaintiff's fault is much beyond fifty per cent, his
chances for a successful jury verdict become slim. The Mississippi
unlimited type of statute would encourage litigation of these cases,
207'VIS. STAT. ANN. §331.045 (1958).

2osCentral R.R. & Banking Co. v. Newman, 94 Ga. 560, 21 S.E. 219 (1894); Smith
v. American Oil Co., 77 Ga. App. 463, 49 S.E.2d 90 (1948); Mishoe v. Davis, 64
Ga. App. 700, 14 S.E.2d 187 (1941).

§1454 (1956).
210p.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, §5141 (Supp. 1957).
209MISS. CODE ANN.

211GREGORY, op cit. supra note 185, at 64; for similar criticisms see Turk, supra
note 95, at 338; Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REv. 465, 494 (1953).
212Powell, supra note 92, at 1008, 1061.
213See Lipscomb, Comparative Negligence, 1951 INS. L.J. 667, 674. If the Canadian type provision (discussed under heading "Other Countries" supra) for equal
apportionment when it is not possible to establish different degrees if fault were
adopted, the limitation would necessarily have to be to the effect that the plaintiff could not recover when his fault was more than that of the defendant.
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whereas "limiting actions to those in which the defendant is more than
half responsible for the accident would probably not inspire any
more cases than we already have .
"..."214 On the other hand, the
present Florida railway accident statute contains no such limitation, 15
and its long successful operation possibly indicates that Florida juries
can be trusted to properly administer the broader type of statute in
2
the automobile accident field. 16
USES OF SPECIAL VERDICTS

Another problem in the administration of the comparative negligence rule is the reliability of jury verdicts in cases in which the
plaintiff's injuries are of a sort likely to evoke excess sympathy from the
jury.

One method of controlling the jury is the special verdict.217

Although it has long been available in Florida,28 it has not been
used in the state courts, other than perhaps under the Declaratory
Judgments Law; 21 9 and the special verdict provisions of the Federal
°
Rules of Civil Procedure are rarely taken advantage of.22
214Kreindler, Comparative Negligence in New York, 11 N.Y. COUNTY BAR BULL.
81, 86 (1953).
21 "The plaintiff is entitled to recover if defendant's negligence was one of
the proximate contributing causes to the injury of the deceased, notwithstanding
the deceased's negligence was greater than that of the defendant." Florida C. & P.
Ry. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 63, 25 So. 338, 344 (1899).
216But recent verdicts like that in Martin v. Tindel, 98 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959 (1958), may cast some doubt on this assumption, at
least when large corporate defendants are involved.
zilAs to special verdicts see Frank, The Case for the Special Verdict, 32 J. A~f.
Jun. Soc. 142 (1949); Green, A New Development in Jury Trial, 13 A.B.A.J. 715
(1927); Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253 (1920).
21SBeckwith v. Bailey, 119 Fla. 316, 161 So. 576 (1935); Florida E.C. Ry. v.
Lassiter, 58 Fla. 234, 50 So. 428 (1909).
219 Under the earlier cases, supra note 218, the Supreme Court of Florida took
the position that a trial court could request the jury to bring in a special verdict
but the jury had the right to decline to do so. Understandably, trial judges were
reluctant to make such requests. But FLA. STAT. §587.08 (1957) apparently gives
the court the right to require the jury to settle questions of fact in declaratory
judgment proceedings not falling within the category of "equity cases." The
Supreme Court of Florida, however, has classified the only case in which the provision has been referred to as an equity case, and there is as yet no record in the
appellate cases of any actual case in which the special verdict procedure has been
utilized.
22
0Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MIcH. L. REv. 465, 501 (1953). The
major advantages to be gained by use of special verdicts have been detailed as
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A part of this reluctance may stem from the general trend toward
extending liability in negligence cases through the use of general verdicts. 2 21 In jurisdictions following the contributory negligence rule, a
general verdict may often hide a jury application of the comparative
negligence approach. With the comparative negligence doctrine
brought out into the open by legislation authorizing its use, the
special verdict will not prevent recovery by a contributorily negligent
plaintiff. Instead, it will protect a defendant from an overly sympathetic jury that might be so impressed by the plaintiff's injuries as
to assess the entire damages against the defendant. If liability is to
be based on comparison of fault, the special verdict can be a useful
tool for assuring that damages will be apportioned on that basis.
The jury can be required to state the amount of the plaintiff's
damages and the percentage of the total negligence attributable to
him and to the defendant.222 The judge can then make the apporfollows by Lipscomb, Special Verdicts Under the Federal Rules, 25 WASH. U.L.Q.
185, 213 (1940):
"By its use the trial judge is relieved from the difficult task of charging the
jury on the law of the case, and thus the danger of errors incident to a lengthy
charge is eliminated. At the same time the jury's task is simplified. Instead of
attempting to understand the court's charge the jury may devote its entire efforts to
the task of answering definite questions of fact. The fact that the jury is relieved
from the task of resolving the controversy for one party or the other, eliminates
as far as possible the ever present dangers of a verdict prompted by sympathy, bias,
or prejudice. Under the necessity of answering definite questions concerning the
facts in issue, the jury is constrained to answer each question in accordance with
the preponderance of the evidence. The individual juryman would be embarrassed
to do otherwise. The very nature of the procedure, the method of allocating the
burden of proof, the placing of emphasis on facts rather than on parties, all tend
toward the development of a scientific and sensible procedure for the jury trial.
"By the use of the special verdict both sides of a controversy may be more
efficiently presented to the jury than under the method of presenting alternates in
in the general charge. Furthermore, if the trial judge misapplies the law to the
special verdict he may correct his error without the necessity of a new trial. And
of outstanding importance is the fact that the definite factual findings furnish a
practical, concrete basis for the appellate court's evaluation of the case on review.
If the only error involves a point of law or a misapplication of law to the facts
by the trial judge, the necessity for a new trial should be eliminated."
22lSee generally discussion under heading "Role of the Jury" supra.
222Dean Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MicH. L. REv. 465, 497 (1953), has
suggested the following as a typical series of questions and answers in a special
verdict in an automobile accident case:
"I. In operating his automobile at the time of and immediately preceding the
collision, was the defendant Smith negligent with respect to the speed of his car?
Yes.
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tionment; and the jury need not even be told that an apportionment
will follow, though in most cases they will undoubtedly realize the
reason behind the special questions they are required to answer.
But, as Dean Prosser has pointed out, "A jury which on general
principles would return a large verdict in favor of a pretty woman
and against a railroad company may well hesitate to return special
23
findings which it knows to be against the evidence.2
The widespread approval of the comparative negligence doctrine in
Wisconsin, as contrasted with the criticism leveled at the Mississippi
legislation, has been attributed to the fact that special verdicts are used
in the application of the doctrine in Wisconsin, whereas Mississippi
retains the general verdict.224 On the other hand, Arkansas, lacking
Wisconsin's experience with the special verdict on an across-the-board
basis, 22 5 apparently found it unwieldy when restricted to comparative
negligence cases; and the Arkansas legislature did away with the compulsory special verdict after only two years of operation under it.226
The comparative negligence bills that failed of enactment in the
1955 and 1957 Florida Legislatures were of the Mississippi type and
contained no special verdict provisions. 227 Since such a requirement
gives added protection to the defendant against overly sympathetic
"2. If you answer Question 1 "Yes," then answer this: Was the defendant
Smith's negligence a cause of the collision? Yes.
"3. In operating his automobile at the time of and immediately preceding the
collision, was the plaintiff Jones negligent with respect to failure to stop before
entering the intersection? Yes.
"4. If you answer Question 3 "Yes," then answer this: Was the plaintiff Jones's
negligence a cause of the collision? Yes.
"5. If you answer all of Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 "Yes," then answer this: What
percentage of the total negligence was attributable to the defendant Smith? 60%.
To the plaintiff Jones? 40%.
"6. What is the amount of the damages plaintiff Jones has sustained? $10,000."
223Prosser, supra note 222, at 502.
224Gilmore, Comparative Negligence from a Viewpoint of Casualty Insurance, 10
ARK. L. REv. 82, 83, 85 (1955); Hayes, supra note 152, at 289; Snow, Comparative
Negligence, 1935 INs. L.J. 235, 240-41. Mr. Snow, vice president and general counsel
of the Pacific Indemnity Co., refers to "the obvious success of the Wisconsin
statute ...."
225The Wisconsin practice was first authorized in 1856. Wis. Laws 1856, c. 120,
§71. It was expanded by Wis. Laws 1874, c. 194, and it was in wide use by 1876;
see McNarra v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 41 Wis. 69 (1876); Williams v. Porter, 41 Wis.
422 (1877); Hutchinson v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 41 Wis. 541 (1877). The present
statute is Wis. STAT. ANN. §§270.27-.30 (1957).
226ARK. STAT. ANN. §27-1730.1-.2 (Supp. 1957).
227H.B. 40, Reg. Sess. 1957; a companion bill died in Senate committee. S.B.
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juries, special verdict provisions might make a future bill more
palatable to the interests that generally oppose such legislation.228
CONCLUSION

The injustice of Florida's harsh contributory negligence rule calls
for legislative correction. The criticism leveled at the rule by Chief
Justice McWhorter in 1886229 is currently being echoed by the Supreme

Court of the United States.

230

Moreover, the contributory negligence

rule is today discredited in the land of its origin. 23 1 It stands con-

demned by the courts, by such respected American writers as Pound, 232
James, 2 33 Prosser,234 and others,2 35 by the State Bar of California, 236
267, Reg. Sess. 1957. Similar legislation failed of enactment in the 1955 session,
H. B. 215.
228Herbert S. Lipscomb, a Mississippi attorney, addressing the Federation of
Insurance Counsel, after criticizing the general verdict practice in Mississippi, says,
"We have not had much experience with special verdicts, because there has never
been any provision for them in this state, but in our humble opinion a provision
for special verdict should go along with a comparative negligence statute as one of
the Siamese twins goes along with the other." Comparative Negligence, 1951 INS.
L.J. 667, 673.
229Louisville & N.R.R. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700 (1886). See discussion under
heading "Florida Developments" supra.
23
0Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). Mr. Justice Black, speaking
for the majority, referred to the contributory negligence rule as "a discredited
doctrine which automatically destroys all claims of injured persons who have contributed to their injuries in any degree, however slight." Id. at 409.
23'Goodheart, who helped write the present English Comparative Negligence
Act, is quoted as saying: "Although at the time when the law was altered here in
England there was some objection to the amendment, all objections to it have
now disappeared. The fear that there would be an inordinate increase in litigation
has proved unfounded. Parties are much more ready to reach a reasonable settlement as they know that the answer is no longer 'all or nothing.'" See Eldredge,
supra note 91, at 54.
2S2Pound, Comparative Negligence, 13 NACCA L.J. 195 (1954).
233 James, Comparative Negligence, 26 UTAH BAR BuLL. 109 (1956); Contributory
Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953).
234Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MicH. L. REv. 465 (1953).
235A definitive early article is that of Mole and Wilson, A Study of Comparative
Negligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333, 604 (1932). For a complete bibliography as of
August 1955, see INsTrrTE OF JUDiCiAL ADMINISTRATION, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
16-21 (1955). At least 15 more recent articles, the great majority of which advocate
a switch to comparative negligence, may be found by consulting the INDEX TO LEGAL
PIUODICALS for the last two years under the topics "Negligence" and "Contributory Negligence."
236See 28 CALIF. S.B.J. 23 (1953).
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by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 237 and by the
Philadelphia Bar Association. 238 It has been replaced by apportionment of damages based on comparative negligence throughout most
of the civilized world. It is engendering disrespect for our courts and
creating unnecessary litigation. The superiority of the comparative
negligence approach appears obvious. It is a reform worthy of serious
consideration by the bar of Florida.
A careful review of comparative negligence legislation in other
2 -40
jurisdictions would be a sound first step. 239 The Wisconsin statute,
though not perfect,241 seems to be the most successful of these laws.

It has won widespread respect, and has the strong support of the
Wisconsin bar. Its provisions are broad enough to overcome some

of the weaknesses previously pointed out in the Mississippi type of
statute, 242 and at the same time it avoids the third party complications that raise doubts as to the workability of the more complicated
Canadian legislation. 243 It might well form the starting point for a
careful study by The Florida Bar designed to produce a workable
statute tailored to the problems and needs of Florida.

237See 39 A.B.A.J. 427 (1953).
23SThe Legal Intelligencer, Jan. 18, 1957, p. 1.
239Some of the American legislation, current and proposed, is collected in Averbach, supra note 160, at 13-16. The British and Canadian statutes may be found
in WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTFEASORS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, App. 1, 2 (1951).
See

also GREGORY,

LEGISLATIVE

Loss

DISTRIBUTION

IN

NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS

56-71,

156-72 (1936).
24OWIs. STAT. ANN. §331.045

2

(1958).

41For a critical and constructive analysis of the Wisconsin statute, see Campbell, Ten Years of Comparative Negligence, 1941 Wis. L. REv. 289.
242See note 148 supra.

243See notes 109-11 supra and accompanying text.
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